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Abstract 
 
This article examines the evolution of the EU ‘redistributive’ policies in the (post-) 
crisis EU era. By reviewing the EU cohesion policy, the financial assistance mechanisms, 
the new economic governance measures and the potentials of attributing the EU fiscal 
capacity, it aims to conceptualize the notion of solidarity as redistribution as this has 
evolved by reason of the crisis. The article argues that by virtue of the diverging 
economies, interests and preferences of the Member States, reciprocal or ‘effects-based 
solidarity’ is the only type of solidarity that has been exhibited among the Member States 
during the crisis. It, further, shows how the principle of solidarity has not lived up to its 
potential in the present crisis context, but it has instead been cropped up in sharply 
different ways in the rhetorics and communications of political parties of all hues across 
the Union.  
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1. Introduction 
 
There has been a lot of debate recently as to whether the EU has exhibited a spirit of 
solidarity during the crisis. The answer, I believe, depends on two variables; first, on how 
one defines solidarity, and secondly, whether there was/is room from a realistic and legal 
perspective to be solidary on a transnational level. 
This article sets out up by providing an overview of the concept of solidarity and its 
evolution. It argues that by reason of the crisis the economic and social differences among 
the Member States have been exacerbated. This has further deepened the division between 
national or social and transnational or inter-state solidarity and has impacted on the 
decisions and choices of the Member States with regard to the national and the EU 
budget(s). In times when national budgets are shrinking it is more likely that the remaining 
funds will be used for national purposes, instead of transnational aid. This contribution will 
argue that by virtue of the increasing division, ‘transnational solidarity’ is to be discerned as 
a reciprocal or ‘negative’ concept. To bring that point home, I will explore the areas that 
pertain to the ‘redistributive’ character of solidarity; the EU cohesion policy, the financial 
assistance mechanisms, the new EU economic governance measures and the potential that 
the EU acquires fiscal capacity.  
 The article, hence, proceeds by delimiting the notion of solidarity for its purposes, into 
solidarity as redistribution. Upon reviewing the main redistributive policy in the EU, the 
EU Cohesion policy as it materializes through the EU Funds, I will turn to examine the 
new economic governance measures of the EU in order to investigate whether the ‘EU 
redistributive’ framework has been solidary and what type of solidarity it has been premised 
upon. 
 
2. The concepts of  solidarity 
 
The concept of solidarity has been enshrined in the Treaties and has regularly been 
used under different Titles as a fundamental guiding principle, in particular when crises 
occur.I In this ‘crisis’ context, the legislator has perceived solidarity as a ‘positive’ or 
altruistic concept which does not merely exist by reason of factual interdependence among 
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the involved States.II In its empirical, factual or ‘commonly understood sense’ solidarity 
expresses the support by one person or group of people for another because they share 
feelings, opinions or aims. It is, thus, perceived as an expression of altruism from groups of 
people towards others.  
In lack of a definition of the concept in the Treaties and in view of its stable presence 
therein, the concept of solidarity encompasses different constituents and perspectives. In 
EU law, the most commonly employed division relates to the solidarity between Member 
States (inter-state or transnational solidarity) and solidarity between Member States and 
their individuals (social or national or intra-state solidarity). Both these types of solidarity 
can further be divided as altruistic or positive and reciprocal or negative. 
 Because of its abstract nature, the concept of solidarity is rather malleable from a legal 
perspective. Its legal ‘provenance’ and value although advocated,III is debated, in particular 
by political scientists, and so is its enforceability.IV Its lack of direct effect may often lead to 
the confinement of the concept in mere rhetoric, or might require its realization through 
more ‘legal’ and enforceable tools, such as the more precise Treaty provision pertaining to 
the EU’s social policy, or the Charter of Fundamental Rights provisions.  
Political and social scientists, philosophers and constitutional lawyers have repeatedly 
attempted to divide solidarity in specific models, either in terms of the different ideological 
and political contexts within which the concept was developed (for instance, the idea of 
Marxist solidarity, of the Christian democratic solidarity or of the classic social theory) or in 
connection to the societal preferences, functioning and development (Durkheim 1964). 
Other designations of the notion of solidarity have related to its constitutional ‘standing’ 
and evolution, or have distinguished solidarity pursuant to its many functions and 
expressions, such as the social and the redistributive ones. 
Solidarity, in the sense of ‘social’ or ‘intra-state’ solidarity is further a relative, 
dependent, evolving and ‘clashing’ concept with implications at the supranational level. Its 
relativity draws a lot from the different understandings of solidarity at the national level, 
which, in turn, are shaped by long-established traditions and ‘prosperity’ or ‘depression 
cycles’. Low levels of social welfare provided in many EU countries, both in more recent 
and more ‘senior’ members, possibly create different levels of expectations in comparison 
to traditionally high level protective Member States, such as the Scandinavian countries. 
Similarly to being a relative concept, solidarity is also a dependent concept. It often 
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depends on a ‘quid pro quo’ interaction which can be discerned both at the national and 
supranational level. The trade-offs required for the redistributive state to perform, entail, in 
most cases, the choice among different levels and quality of supply of public (or quasi 
public) goods, different taxation systems and rates and different state intervention levels. 
These decisions usually take place at the national level and they are shaped in accordance 
with each state’s traditions, culture and preferences, represented at a higher level by the 
elected governments. This way these choices enjoy democratic legitimacy. Naturally, these 
national preferences and benchmarks are then, transposed to the EU level, creating 
different expectations and different dispositions towards the associated ‘trade-offs’ among 
people who are united by a certain degree of economic integration, but not by any sense of 
demos or identity.  
It is, in principle, the EU who has to bridge these different dispositions via 
harmonization or regulation. The situation is similar at the EU level, where choices have to 
be made both with regard to the objectives of the redistribution, the share each of the 
partners contributes, the anticipated results and the potential gains for all the participants. 
At this redistribution level the EU is, thus, called to perform some sort of cost benefit 
analysis while respecting and allocating –to the extent possible - the different political, 
economic and social backgrounds of the Member States.  
The witnessing of the deterioration of social benefits and services–in particular in the 
financially assisted Member States, and the increase of the economic, social and political 
disparities among the Member States by reason of the crisis made more skeptical the 
people of the Union with regard to the EU’s room and willingness to act against the crisis. 
The ‘bail out’ mechanisms that prevented the default of some countries and the state aids 
that halted the bankruptcy of major banks could be perceived more as an effort to save the 
Eurozone and the huge economic interests involved, rather than as an attempt to alleviate 
the burden from the socially disadvantaged. Similarly, the dire economic situation and the 
shrinking budgets of most Member States were calling for swift decisions with regard to 
solidarity; solidarity within the state and towards each state’s own nationals, or trans-
national solidarity that would help keep the EU construct together? The perception of the 
peoples of Europe would play a key role in this dilemma, as the democratically elected 
governments would, at least in theory, be called to apply policy choices for and from the 
people (input and output legitimacy). However, despite the intergovernmental character of 
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the new economic governance measures, democratically deliberative decision-making 
remained absent in the process of their adoption. With or without democratic legitimation, 
in view of this economic situation, the increasing divide between the Member States and 
the growing uncertainty about the future, the solidarity to be ‘provided’ would, inevitably, 
be limited and could not any more function in its altruistic understanding but had to come 
with guarantees, safeguards and mutual returns for all participants (Giubboni 2010).V  
 
3. Solidarity as redistribution: Altruism versus Reciprocity 
 
In most scholarly literature solidarity is deeply connected to redistribution and, in turn, 
to distributive justice. Should there be redistribution, what purposes should it serve and 
should it be connected to moral assessments are only a few questions that pertain to the 
concept of solidarity.VI 
In EU law solidarity has been perceived as a legal concept. Already in the TEC the 
Communities intended to promote inter alia economic and social cohesion and solidarity 
among Member States (Article 2 TEC). The instutionalization of solidarity which has 
underpinned the EU integration project since its very beginnings has historically served to 
bridge ‘social conflicts and redistributing resources in accordance with the normative 
assumptions that are implicit in a polity’ (de Witte 2012: 704). Solidarity has, thus, been 
associated (both at national and supranational level) not only with the concept of 
redistribution which constitutes the means to achieve it, but also with the concept of social 
justice (the purpose or the normative assumption), including the promotion of social rights, 
labour and employment rights, fundamental rights and related policy areas that derive from 
a welfare state. But in the ‘quid pro quo’ trade-off between market principles and social 
objectives, the Court of Justice has repeatedly given priority to economic integration and 
market(s)’ liberalization while ignoring the ‘social state’.VII This finding cannot be 
disassociated from the fact that it has been the economic freedoms and the competition 
law provisions in the Treaties that constituted the motor of the European integration 
throughout the years. While the Member States agreed to a transfer of powers with respect 
to the aforementioned economic policy areas to the EU, powers relating to the social 
sphere and the welfare state remained at nation-state level, where it was believed they could 
be better addressed. As social policies remained decoupled from the ‘economic’ European 
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project, economic integration was advancing while social integration was lagging, to say the 
least, behind. Thus, the welfare state evolved along territorial lines based on – however 
diffuse – notions of national solidarity between citizens of nation States. By being 
‘stranded’ at the national level, the welfare or social state was dependent on redistributive 
choices at the national level.  
This article will examine redistribution as a constituent of solidarity.VIII Redistribution, 
in turn, is to be understood as distributive justice or distributional equity.IX Redistribution 
as a constituent of solidarity and as an essential component of most welfare states has been 
shaped through time by social, political and economic considerations and within the 
appropriate historical contexts. Similarly to the concept of solidarity, redistribution is 
characterized by a relative, evolving and contextual nature. Rawls’s preference for a 
consumption tax to an income tax, and a flat tax rate over a progressive tax rate, for 
instance, sits uneasily with the empirical understanding of ‘(re)distributive justice’ or the 
best means to achieve it.X Similarly, a progressive income tax rate of up to 70% (with a 
redistributive purpose) for the very wealthy taxpayers would possibly be perceived as ‘fair’ 
by the beneficiaries of redistribution but unjust for the highly taxed people. These choices 
are usually reflected at Member State level through elections, and as they entail income 
and/or wealth reallocations they require enhanced democratic legitimacy. Compulsory 
taxation and the associated tax transfers, for instance, as the main source of redistribution 
are telling of the need for increased democratic legitimization and as such they still remain 
within the nation-state (or Member State ambit).XI  
In the current crisis framework the first question that arises is whether the 
redistribution that takes place at the supranational level serves welfare purposes 
(distributive justice). Secondly, should the materialization of ‘transnational solidarity’ via 
‘state redistributions’ be decoupled from motives and moral assessments behind 
redistribution? In other words, should solidarity as redistribution at the state contribution 
level be connected to the ideas of altruism, empathy and of noble moral motives?  
As with the case of ‘justice as reciprocity’ advanced by John Rawls, Brian Barry and 
many others, solidarity (as redistribution or in any other form) can materialize even under 
pure reciprocal or quid pro quo grounds, whereby the contributor shares with the recipient in 
anticipation of a (future) counter-contribution or fair return.XII For some authors, however, 
motives do matter when defining solidarity. Accordingly, the behavior as such is not 
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sufficient to establish solidarity if it is not accompanied by an appropriate kind of belief 
and altruism (Harvey 2007). A more moderate approach with regard to the values of 
altruism and self-interest in solidarity has been expressed by Viehoff and Nicolaidis, who 
placed solidarity in their ‘solidarity compass’ at the intersection of the two continuums of 
self-interest and Community and of altruism and obligation. For them, solidarity describes 
‘a relationship that is motivated to some extent by each of these powerful motives, but 
[remains] irreducible to either one of them’ (Viehoff and Nicolaidis 2015). 
Understanding solidarity as redistribution and accepting the idea that this concept need 
not necessarily encompass any altruistic or empathetic elements is crucial in order to 
evaluate whether the EU response in the current crisis has exhibited a spirit of solidarity, as 
termed for the purposes of this contribution. If one, however, disassociates solidarity from 
any motives and moral assessments, solidarity will be assessed only by reason of its effects 
to distributive justice and the welfare state.  
As the following parts aim to highlight, in the EU redistribution context there is no 
pure altruism. In the best case scenario one can place solidarity in the ‘solidarity compass’ 
at the intersection of the aforementioned continuums. This, however, does not mean that 
solidarity is absent altogether in the (post-) crisis legal framework. By contrast, as the EU 
cohesion policy and the new economic governance measures’ analyses will show, it exists 
partly by virtue of its effects and processes rather than by reason of the intentions behind it.  
At present, redistribution is divided in the EU. Similar to direct taxation, redistribution 
is entrusted, to a large part, to the Member States – in agreement with the fiscal federalism 
theory. It is the Member States, in principle, that decide how they will allocate their revenues, 
how they will form their budget and to what degree they will opt for a ‘social’ and welfare 
state model. In accord with that, the main instrument for redistribution, taxation, is almost 
entirely reserved for the Member States. In an effort, however, to balance the uneven 
distributive impact of Europeanisation the EU has obtained an institutionalized and 
constitutionalized redistributive role which is fulfilled by virtue of the EU budget and the 
EU cohesion policy (EU funds) and through regulation both at EU and national level.  
 
3.1. The EU Cohesion Policy 
The EU Cohesion policy is dedicated to bridging the discrepancies among the various 
Member States and to assisting the Member States ‘in need’. It thus, aims to attain 
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economic, social and territorial cohesion among the Member States (Art. 174-178 TFEU) 
and it currently figures as a major cornerstone in the ‘Europe 2020’ strategy. After the 
numerous and complex reforms it has undergone, since its first appearance in the mid-
1970s, the EU Cohesion policy, which is effectuated through the EU Funds, currently 
accounts for a large part of the EU budget at EUR 351.8 billion for the period 2014-2020. 
Consequently, a large part of the EU budget is being spent on effectuating the EU 
cohesion policy into the major redistribution policy instrument in the EU. 
The EU cohesion policy has an important place in EU philosophy and is governed by 
the ‘redistributive idea’ which stems from the intuitively reasonable assumption that the 
‘less favoured’ regions are in need of ‘EU funding’ in order to be able to compete in the 
common market against the more favoured ones.XIII This idea of the ‘subsidization’ by the 
beneficiaries of European integration and regulatory competition seems to match partly, 
Maduro’s idea of being solidary ‘by establishing a link between the wealth generated by 
European integration and the requirement to distribute it fairly’ and seems to confirm the 
idea that solidarity in EU law should be discerned as a ‘reciprocal’ concept (Maduro 2012: 
6). As a redistributive idea, the EU cohesion policy is intrinsically linked to the 
development of the EU budget.  
The, by comparison, small amounts destined to reduce the regional economic and 
social disparities among the Member States and their regions are per se a problem in the 
realization of this goal. The unwillingness of many Member States to contribute to this 
redistributive policy is the second obstacle in this process. As the role of cohesion policy is 
to bring closer the richer and poorer parts of the EU, it is inevitable that the EU budget 
allocations would not be unanimously endorsed. National interests in the amounts and the 
allocations involved are divided, with the ‘traditional net payers’ or, in other words, the 
‘richer’ Member States opposing more spending and the traditional ‘beneficiaries’ or the 
poorer States aiming for even more financing to compete with the richer ones on equal 
grounds (Bachtler et al. 2013).XIV This opposition to a larger EU budget for redistributive 
purposes has been exacerbated as a result of the crisis. The ‘profligate south’, a habitual 
recipient of EU Funds, being in a dire economic situation, inevitably asks for more money, 
whereas the ‘prudent north’, the main financier of both the EU funds and the EU financial 
assistance has been more hesitant to disburse funds merely for benevolent reasons 
established on mutual trust and the need for a more coherent Europe.  
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On the same reciprocal basis, the political bargaining, inherent in the decision-making 
procedure that leads to the adoption of the EU budget has been extended also in the 
‘greatest redistributive’ representative policies of all, the EU cohesion policy. Many 
Member States have used cohesion policies as a bargaining tool to obtain resources in 
return for political compromises (Nicola 2015) or as a side-payment and a redistributive 
mechanism for budgetary contributions to compensate states in the context of a new 
enlargement (Wishlade 1996) or even as an enforcement mechanism in case a Member 
State does not respect the rule of law desiderata (Closa et al. 2014). In the last case, the 
Commission has repeatedly suspended the EU funds’ disbursement to Hungary on 
grounds of unscrupulous processes in the selection of projects (2015) of the transfer of 
responsibilities of the funds’ administration to the Office of the Prime Minister and other 
ministries (2013) and of excessive deficits (2012).  
The source of this lack of altruism in a purely redistributive policy could be found in 
the diametrically different economies, and by implication, to the diverging preferences and 
priorities of the Member States, the lack of a ‘Union’ and a common ethos, demos and 
purpose. It can also be justified by the different ‘performance’ of the Member States in the 
implementation of the EU cohesion policy which pertains to their different administrative, 
absorption and spending capacities, their participation and administrative cultures, their 
corruption levels as well as the complicated and multi-level governance the EU has 
designed for this policy.  
The first pitfall relates to the poorer Member States’ capacity to absorb and utilize the 
allocated funds. The complex legal framework of the ESI Funds necessitates a very 
sophisticated administrative capacity at Member State level to manage and implement the 
Funds. In consequence, the spending capacity of the Member States depends largely on the 
ability of the (multiple) involved authorities, at national, regional and local level to set up 
authorities adept at complying with the highly demanding administrative work entailed, as 
well as to the ability of the Member States or regions to secure co-financing for the projects 
(Regulation 1303/2013, Recitals 26 and 105). Such an undertaking comprises the selection 
of the projects to be financed, in accordance with the multi-annual planning approved by 
the Commission and the monitoring of their implementation. Evidence from the 
Commission, for the programming period 2007-2013, highlight a series of other factors 
that affect the low absorption rates by some Member States, including the challenges in 
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preparing major infrastructure projects and obtaining the Commission’s approval, the 
changes in EU legislation and the changes in the national political set up (including changes 
in national and regional governments). 
Similarly to the administrative incapacity of some Member States to absorb the funds, 
the principles of additionality and complementarity that undergo the EU Funds aim at 
ensuring that the funds provided by the EU are not intended to substitute national 
investment but only to supplement it. In conjunction with the co-financing principle, thus, 
the EU can only partly finance projects. Although this requirement might pose significant 
problems to the absorption of the funds by the poorer Member States, the Commission 
has, by reason of the crisis, waived or reduced the fixed co-financing rates in order to 
facilitate the disbursement of EU funds. Furthermore, taking stock of the prior 
problematic implementation of the EU cohesion policy instruments by the Member States, 
Regulation 1303/2013 has placed particular emphasis on thematic and general ex ante 
conditionality provisions. Compliance with those conditionalities, however, although 
aiming at ensuring a better implementation of the EU funds, it also increases the 
administrative and real costs for the candidate Member States.XV  
Besides the different absorption levels of the Member States, the implementation of 
the EU Funds relates further to the diverging political, administrative and cultural ‘profiles’ 
of the Member States. The partnership principle is another distinctive principle of the EU 
cohesion policy and is complementary to the shared management principle. Its main goal is 
to involve, throughout all the stages (implementation, monitoring and evaluation of 
Partnership Agreements), different actors at both supranational and national level in order 
to  
 
‘ensure respect for the principles of multi-level governance, and also of subsidiarity and 
proportionality and the specificities of the Member States' different institutional and 
legal frameworks as well as to ensure the ownership of planned interventions by 
stakeholders and build on the experience and the know-how of relevant actors.’ 
(Regulation 1303/2013, Recital 11). 
 
The involvement of different actors (national, sub-national, private, NGOs) in the 
decision making and implementation process depends on the different political ‘traditions’ 
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of the Member States and certainly affects the outcomes of the EU Cohesion policy. The 
‘north’ versus ‘south’ divide is conspicuous also in this respect; Southern countries tend to 
‘centralize’ the decision making, whereas the northern countries are more apt to the 
involvement of other actors in the decision making process. This, certainly, has an impact 
on all levels of the implementation process, from the priorities and the goals to be served, 
to the project-selection process. Likewise, the different corruption levels at various 
Member States influence the EU funds’ allocations. While examples of mismanagement, 
fraud and EU money waste are not to be found only in ‘southern’ countries, it is mostly the 
countries with the highest corruption perception index (CPI) that either fail to carry out the 
projects they were funded for, or prove to have invested the money in poor ‘value for 
money’ projects.  
The European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF) and the European Court of Auditors (ECA) 
provide ample data that bespeak the EU Funds’ amenability to abuse and fraud. During the 
annual audit the ECA carried out for 2013, it found with regard to the regularity of the 
transactions underlying the EU accounts, that while both revenue and financial 
commitments for 2013 were regular, the estimated error rate for 2013 payments was 4.7%, 
remaining persistently higher than the “materiality threshold” of 2%. (ECA 2014a) Errors 
arise when payments from the EU budget ‘are neither legal nor regular, for example when 
claimed by ineligible beneficiaries, for expenditure that should not be financed by the EU, 
or when the conditions for receiving the aid are not followed.’ (ECA 2014c) Thus, for a 
payment to be classified as ‘error’ it has to be contrary to the law and have a potentially 
harmful impact on the EU’s financial interests. 
Typical sources of error, besides compliance with eligibility criteria, include serious 
breaches of public procurement rules either deliberately, in order to favour certain 
applicants over others, or inadvertently because of the complexity of the rules (ECA 2015); 
effectively ‘poor’ checks and controls by both the Commission and the Member States, 
focus of the Member States on the absorption of the Funds rather than on their ‘good 
spending’ and incorrect declarations of agricultural areas. (ECA 2014a) 
With regard to financial recommendations, upon conducting significant investigations, 
OLAF recommended in the area of EU Funds a financial recovery of 476.5 million Euros 
for year 2014, almost triple the size in comparison to the next in the ladder external aid 
(amounts recommended by OLAF for financial recovery in this sector, 174.0 million 
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Euros) (OLAF 2014). Similarly for 2011, OLAF revealed that of the total amounts 
recovered, approximately 85% comes directly from the EU Funds.XVI 
 
 
One cannot, therefore, be taken by surprise at the suspiciousness of the ‘performing’ 
and ‘donor’ Member States regarding the value and effectiveness of the EU Cohesion 
policy as well as the geographical coverage of the policy. XVII The incapacity of some states 
to absorb the funds, or to spend them in the best possible way often results in unfinished 
or poor value for money results which in turn, deepens the divide between intra- and inter-
state solidarity. Why ‘waste’ money on a ‘lost cause’ when this money could be used for 
improving the wellbeing of your own ‘nationals’? The discontent of some Member States 
about the continuation of the ‘cross-subsidization’ of the poorer regions and states shows, 
once again, that solidarity in the EU should not be understood in its altruistic capacity. This 
is further advocated by the fact that this subsidization does not come for free and is not 
unlimited. Member States have to participate in the financing of the projects in accordance 
with the additionality and complementarity principles and they have to provide evidence as 
to their capacity to absorb and manage these funds towards the desired goal.  
The Member States, their different cultures and their very different economies and 
interests are not the sole culprits of this building of apprehension, and possibly even, 
mistrust behind this redistributive policy. The role of the EU in this is not to be neglected; 
the number of material errors, and everything this is associated to, could certainly be 
reduced had the disbursement of the EU Funds been properly and adequately monitored 
and sanctioned by the EU when needed. The current legal framework leaves too much 
leeway to the Member States not only to implement the ESI Funds but also to monitor this 
implementation.XVIII Among the ex post conditionalities, lays the Commission’s or the 
Member States’ obligation in close cooperation with the Commission, to carry out 
evaluations in order to examine the effectiveness and efficiency of the ESI Funds and their 
contribution to the Union strategy for growth. In case of non-compliance with the 
designated criteria (as these are laid out in the Partnership Agreements) the most severe 
remedial action is the suspension of the interim payments or a reduction of the funds to be 
disbursed, a remedy that does not seem sufficient to deter mismanagement actions. 
Similarly, in case the preemptive ex ante conditionalities fail to ensure compliance with the 
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EU standards, the Member States and/or the Commission can impose financial 
corrections, in other words, they may recover payments that should not have been paid 
out. 
The often ‘poor results’ or the questionable motives, however, do not negate the 
positive effects of the EU cohesion policy to the ‘welfare state’. Indicatively, only for part 
of the programming period 2007 – 2013 and only by virtue of the ERDF co-financed 
interventions, approximately 593,954 jobs had been directly created across the EU. 
(European Commission 2014c).  
 
3.2. The EU Budget as an expression of solidarity 
The EU budget and the EU funds disbursed therefrom do not constitute the only 
means of redistribution in the EU. Redistribution can be achieved through regulation in 
other EU policy areas, for instance via the Single Resolution Mechanism and the Single 
Resolution Fund or via ‘distributional steering’ at the national level through the 
involvement of the EU in the budgetary policies of the Member States.XIX 
 In a complete economic Union where the EU would be granted tax raising powers, 
redistribution could further be attained through taxation and in the post-crisis framework 
redistribution can be attained through the financial assistance mechanisms such as the ESM 
and the EFSF.  
 
3.2.1. The first hybrid indirect redistributions in the face of the crisis 
The EU budget constitutes the main form of redistribution in the EU. In lack of an 
EU fiscal capacity, whereby redistribution would depend largely on the revenues arising 
from taxation, redistribution via the EU budget is currently effectuated through regulation, 
as the example of the EU Cohesion policy demonstrates. The crisis, however, and the need 
for imminent actions in order to save countries from defaulting and the Euro-currency as a 
whole initiated new structures, what I term for the purposes of this article, hybrid indirect 
redistributions.  
The first type of ‘hybrid indirect redistributions’ materialized through the granting of 
financial assistance to the Member States in need, either through the European Stability 
Mechanism (ESM), and earlier under Memoranda of Understanding (MoU) or the 
European Financial Stability Mechanism (EFSM) or the European Financial Stability 
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Facility (EFSF). These indirect redistributions were not effectuated directly via the EU 
budget, but instead they constituted some form of fiscal transfers among the Member 
States. These transfers have temporarily – at least – contributed to the rescue of certain 
Member States in need and have, thus, exhibited a spirit of assistance in that each euro area 
Member State has participated with its capital to the ESM.  
But are these two elements sufficient to mitigate the ‘negative’ solidarity caveats the 
financial assistance mechanisms entail; First of all the conditionalities attached to all the 
financial assistance programmes and secondly the ulterior motives behind their granting. It 
has been argued that the institutionalization of these financial assistance mechanisms, 
which was culminated with the establishment of the permanent ESM, marked the 
transition from ‘negative’ to ‘positive’ solidarity and demarcated a new era for ‘normative’ 
solidarity (Borger 2013). This ‘crisis-induced’ shift can be illustrated, according to Borger, 
via the ‘departure from an economic policy that is predominantly focused on budgetary 
prudence and price stability to one that takes better into account financial stability as well.’ 
The broad interpretation of the ‘no-bail out’ clause by the CJEU in the Pringle case,XX and 
the authorization the CJEU gave the ECB for bond-buying in the secondary marketsXXI 
point indeed towards a more ‘altruistic’ version of solidarity, one that aspires to the 
common good.  
While, indeed, both from an ex post factual assessment, as well as from a strictly legal 
perspective, the financial assistance that allowed some Member States not to default cannot 
be overlooked,XXII the motives and the conditions attached to this financial assistance are 
not, in my view, capable of altering the reciprocal character of solidarity into an altruistic or 
positive one (Hilpold 2014). With regard to the ulterior motives behind the granting of 
financial assistance, as the press at that time argued, the granting of assistance aspired to 
the saving of the Eurozone as a whole, given the possible domino effects the default of 
one Eurozone country could cause to the other Eurozone members. This finding is further 
reinforced by the fact that the response to the two alleged causes of the crisis, the EU’s 
structural problem of a single currency union without a fiscal union, in other words the EU 
being a non-optimal currency area, and the fiscal profligacy of the Member States resulting 
from the unenforceability of the Stability and Growth Pact, was initially focused on 
enhancing fiscal surveillance and fiscal discipline in the EU. 
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Despite many political assertions that one of the driving powers behind the 
strengthening of stability, unity, and integrity of the euro area was solidarity, Draghi’s 
speech in July 2012 who reassured the markets that “the ECB is ready to do whatever it 
takes to preserve the euro. And believe me, it will be enough” revealed the true motives 
behind the ‘solidary character’ the EU and the Member States had demonstrated recently. 
Certainly, one could not expect much more from an independent institution entrusted with 
conducting the monetary policy of the Union (Article 282 TFEU).  
However, it soon became clear that the use of the ‘solidarity rhetorics’ in various 
political statements, both at national and supranational level, was not sufficient to upgrade 
the solidarity principle into a critical principle in the crisis resolution nor to attribute it a 
‘positive’ or altruistic meaning. As such, despite solidarity being a legal concept in EU law 
and a long-standing principle in the process of the European integration, it has not 
unfolded to lead to in concreto solutions in the present crisis. From the recent economic 
governance measures, the concept of solidarity, surprisingly, figures only in the Preamble 
of the ESM Treaty, where it is confined in the statement that ‘[T]his Treaty and the TSCG 
are complementary in fostering fiscal responsibility and solidarity within the economic and 
monetary union.’ Similarly, the concept of solidarity was entirely absent in the Pringle 
judgment with the exception of the citation of Art. 122 TFEU, which makes reference to 
the principle. The Court, unfortunately, did not build upon AG Kokott’s opinion, who 
elaborated on the concept of solidarity and the requirement to provide inter-state financial 
assistance, and missed, hence, an opportunity to define transnational solidarity in its EMU 
and crisis contexts. 
Similarly, the very strict conditionalities attached to the provision of financial assistance 
are, certainly, not sufficient to cancel out the financial assistance’s redistributive character 
but could prove adequate to refute the financial assistance’s ‘positive solidary’ character. 
They instead, simply, ascribe a different feature to the notion of solidarity, that of a 
reciprocal disposition, or rather a ‘solidarity of fact’. The conditionalities the bailout 
programmes entail, for instance, fail to promote social solidarity as they impinge upon the 
social policies of the Member States and they often require introducing detrimental to the 
welfare state measures.XXIII They, hence, aim at ensuring that the benefited States will 
comply with the ‘budgetary discipline’ attached to the assistance and that moral hazard will 
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be avoided rather than guaranteeing that the citizens of the assisted states will enjoy a 
higher degree of welfare at no additional cost.  
 
3.2.2. The ‘supranational regulation’ of national budgetary policies: a new window of opportunity? 
The second hybrid form of redistribution relates to the EU’s increased participation in the 
formation of national budgets. This enhanced role, in particular by the Commission, has 
been reinforced by the new crisis legal instruments, such as the European Semester and the 
Six-Pack.XXIV The former aims at intensifying, synchronizing and centralizing the 
coordination of national budgets and economic policies by allowing the Commission to 
review the Member States’ budgets and to assess whether the national draft budgetary 
plans comply with the ‘Sic Pack’ criteria. At the end of the calendar year, and the beginning 
of the ‘Semester cycle’ year the Commission publishes its Annual Growth Survey and its 
Alert Mechanism Report which identifies the Member States that need an in-depth review 
because of the potential imbalances detected, likely to disrupt the smooth functioning of 
the Member States’ economies. Based on the findings of these reviews the embedded in 
the European Semester Macroeconomic Imbalances Procedure (MIP) might be triggered, 
and if the imbalances are considered excessive the Excessive Imbalance Procedure (EIP) 
will be launched. In contrast, if the imbalances are not found excessive the ‘preventive arm’ 
of the MIP will be activated and the Commission’s recommended policy responses to the 
imbalances will be integrated into the Country Specific Recommendations (CSR).  
Looking at the specific country recommendations for 2014, one can observe that some 
recommendations address sensitive issues relevant to Member States’ national sovereignty, 
like taxation and social policies. The conditionalities attached to any (pre- or post- ESM) 
financial assistance, as well as the Country Specific Recommendations made by the 
Commission to the Member States have direct and immediate implications for the 
economic and social policy choices for the future of Europe and its Member States, 
pertaining for instance to employment, social security and taxation issues. These 
recommendations, whether of a very specific nature or not, can produce sanctions under 
the Excessive Deficit Procedure and the Excessive Imbalance Procedure, if the Member 
States fail repeatedly to take action on public finances or macroeconomic imbalances 
respectively. This possibility of intervention to the national budget-planning of the Member 
States given to the European Commission under the European Semester in conjunction 
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with the Six-Pack can open new pathways for the EU to promote both transnational and 
social solidarity. As the improvement of employment policy and social protection figures 
among the cornerstones to boost growth, I see this involvement as a window of 
opportunity for the Commission to coordinate all budgets towards a welfare state. While 
this statement is quite far-fetched, in particular as the potential sanctions for non-
performance relate not so much to the specific recommendations but rather to the 
achieved results with regard to the macroeconomic imbalances and public finances, it is 
useful to demonstrate the increased involvement of the Union in national budgetary 
decisions.XXV This expanding intervention signifies, further, a disregard –on behalf of the 
Union -- of the ‘higher democratic legitimacy’ required in fiscal and budgetary policies, 
than the one delivered by a strongly intergovernmental approach. Leaving, however, aside 
the democratic legitimization of the Commission, and the Union altogether, to have a say 
in, if not dictate, the budgetary policies of the Member States; the bait lies for the EU, in 
balancing, when interfering to the national budgets either through the conditionalities or 
via the Semester means, market and social objectives. Fiscal entrenchment and 
consolidation and the promotion of social policies and employment are not always easy to 
match. Fears are increasing, therefore, as to whether the EU’s goals include the promotion 
of a welfare state or whether they will advance ‘[…] a regime that would allow for the 
projection of market imperatives onto national budgets without any specific democratic 
legitimation’ (Habermas 2011).  
While the history of European integration, the crisis legal framework as well as the case 
law of the CJEU point towards a market-oriented approach, the dire economic and, often, 
humanitarian situation of many Member States has pushed the EU decision-makers to 
review the impact of the new economic governance measures on the social policies. 
According to the ‘five presidents’’’ report ‘employment and social concerns must feature 
highly in the European Semester. Unemployment, especially long term unemployment, is 
one of the main reasons for inequality and social exclusion.’ In order to promote more 
‘social cohesion’ and ‘social justice’ the European Commission can commence from 
promoting through its interference in the national budgets more ‘socially’ or ‘solidary’ (in 
its social sense) policies. Such a venture could be achieved, for instance, by taking social 
imbalances into account when assessing convergence and imbalances (Notre Europe Policy 
Paper), or by ‘coercing’ the Member States to apply social redistributive measures, such as 
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progressive taxation, or wealth taxes or special levies on luxury goods, instead of increasing 
taxes related to labour. Through this ‘backdoor’ intrusion, the EU as a whole can for the 
first time influence the ‘hard core’ national policies towards a more ‘social justice’ oriented 
goal.  
 
3.2.3. The ‘potential’: Attributing the EU a fiscal capacity? 
By reason of the fact that the EU is not a federal state, it is caught in the paradoxical 
situation where it has little fiscal capacity but regulates the fiscal conduct of the member 
states (Hallerberg 2014).  
The recent discussions on the possibility of attributing the EU fiscal capacity, in other 
words, giving the EU the power to raise taxes, in order to create a ‘federal budget’ that 
could be used as a ‘crisis-buffer’ are stretching the EU’s competences and challenge its 
creativity in finding new ways to overcome constitutional and institutional problems.XXVI  
The primary advantage of granting the EU fiscal capacity would be the increase of the 
EU budget. The second big advantage is that the transfer of tax raising powers to the EU, 
provided it is democratically legitimized, would ‘democratize’ also the EU’s spending 
powers.  
The Van Rompuy report recommended that the central level of the euro area should be 
equipped with powers for common decision-making on national budgets or else be given a 
fiscal capacity of its own.XXVII By analogy with the existing minimal EU budget, a fiscal 
capacity could be funded from contributions of member states in relation to their 
economic output, or via a fixed share of national taxes (e.g. value-added tax), or a common 
European tax like the financial transaction tax (FTT), which, however, unlike the FTT 
would have to be collected in all Member States. Such an option would require Treaty 
amendments, providing, inter alia, the legal basis for ‘a new taxation power at the EU level, 
or a power to raise revenue by indebting itself on the markets (presently barred by Articles 
310 and 311 TFEU)’ (European Commission 2012). Such a central fiscal capacity could 
materialize, according to the van Rompuy report, via the establishment of a mechanism 
‘where contributions and disbursements would be based on fluctuations in cyclical revenue 
and expenditure items, or on measures of economic activity’ (macroeconomic approach) 
which would ‘be more directly linked to a specific public function sensitive to the 
economic cycle.’ 
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The Commission’s discussion on the fiscal capacity of the EMU, suggesting, among 
other solutions, a Treaty amendment to include a legal basis attributing tax raising powers 
to the EU seems highly unlikely in view of the unanimity required under the ordinary 
legislative procedure in order to proceed to such a conferral of a new competence.XXVIII 
The merits of such an unrealistic proposal were listed by the Commission in the same 
document: ‘In contrast, that problem [the fundamental accountability problem in case of 
joint and several guarantees of all euro area Member States] would no longer arise in a full 
fiscal and economic union which would itself dispose of a substantial central budget, the resources 
for which would be derived, in due part, from a targeted, autonomous power of taxation and from the 
possibility to issue the EU's own sovereign debt, concomitant with a large-scale pooling of 
sovereignty over the conduct of economic policy at EU level. The European Parliament 
would then have reinforced powers to co-legislate on such autonomous taxation and 
provide the necessary democratic scrutiny for all decisions taken by the EU's executive. 
Member States would not be jointly and severally liable for each other's sovereign debt but 
at most for that of the EU’ (European Commission 2012).  
Regardless of the political unlikelihood of attributing taxing powers to the EU, the 
latter should not be confused with ‘tax harmonisation’. Article 311 (2) TFEU on the 
Union’s own resources provides that the Council may establish new categories of own 
resources, upon unanimous approval by the Member States. The use of this provision as a 
legal basis for the establishment of an EU tax has been contested. An expansive reading of 
Article 311 (2) TFEU would argue that under the ‘own resources’ provision, the Council 
(acting unanimously) could actually also introduce outright, as a new 'own resources' even 
an EU income tax (Plasschaert 2004). In contrast, a more restrictive reading, interprets the 
provision as only implying that the Member States cannot refuse to pay their contributions 
to the EU budget. 
While the relationship between the ‘approximation of tax laws’ provisions (Art. 113 – 
115 TFEU) and the ‘own resources’ one (Art. 311 TFEU), is unclear, the political 
constraint of unanimity they both suffer from makes the chances of harmonisation of tax 
laws or the creation of a new tax, rather limited. The adoption of the indirect Financial 
Transaction Tax (FTT) under Article 113 TFEU and not under Art. 311 (2) TFEU, is a 
curious one. One reason for the selection of this legal basis could be the fact that  
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 'part of receipts generated by the FTT shall constitute an own resource for the EU 
budget [...] and the portion of the FTT revenue that remains in the national budgets could 
be used to help consolidate public finances, invest in growth-promoting activity or meet 
development aid commitments. Ultimately, it will be for participating Member States to 
decide how the revenues of the FTT should be used.'XXIX 
Another possibility lies in the preexistence of this type of tax in the most national 
orders’ of the Member States, which would call for ‘harmonization’ of the existing taxes. A 
more suspicious ‘reading’ of this choice could possibly argue that the choice of Art. 113 
TFEU allows for enhanced cooperation to apply (if there is no unanimity), as happened in 
the FTT case, while art 311 TFEU cannot be circumvented by enhanced cooperation 
(meaning that decisions can only be taken unanimously). Indeed the possible application of 
enhanced cooperation in the establishment of an ‘EU tax’ under Art. 311 TFEU would 
create practical problems, in the sense that a number of Member States would be forced to 
pay their contributions –in the form of the newly established taxes, while another one 
would contribute to the EU budget via the traditional own resources means.XXX Such a 
possibility, however, by creating an additional taxing burden (raised revenue for public 
services) to the taxpayers of the participant states, will lead to inequalities within the EU 
and most likely to a ‘two-tier’ EU budget; An ‘enhanced’ one and the ‘traditional’ one.  
Even if we assume that Art. 113 and/or Art. 311 TFEU are meant to give the 
Eurozone tax raising powers, a statement the Commission does not endorse, we should 
not neglect the (unfeasible or not very probable to be attained) unanimity required under 
both provisions. This unlikelihood in conjunction with the unlikelihood, to say the least of 
a Treaty amendment, suggests one possibly (more) tenable solution; building the tax raising 
or tax policy making power of the EMU on the legitimacy-shaky grounds of the enhanced 
cooperation, as was eventually employed for the introduction of the Financial Transaction 
Tax. This circular argument presupposes the (problematic) choice of Art. 113 TFEU as a 
legal basis. Recourse to the passerelle clause, if accepted at the Council level, would enhance 
the democratic legitimacy of such a decision but would certainly add to the unfeasibility of 
such an undertaking. XXXI  
All these political and legal constraints advocate the reliance of the EU on other 
institutional ‘ways out’ such as the creation of an EMU Treasury within the Commission 
and a corresponding, dedicated budgetary and own resources procedure,XXXII which 
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certainly comes with its own set of problems, most notably acceptance by the participating 
Member States and democratic legitimization. Other solutions proposed in the framework 
of a ‘fiscal federation by exception’ (Trichet 2012, Vanistendael 2010 and 2011) suggest the 
setting up of a ministry of Finance of the Euro area, which would have the responsibility of 
the activation of the economic and fiscal federation when and where necessary, while it 
would be responsible for the handling of the crisis management tools like the ESM. 
Another suggestion advances the ECB as the optimal solution, an institution which 
certainly does not meet the democratic legitimacy criterion, or a new institution to be 
created within the Euro group that would fulfil the political legitimacy and accountability 
criteria (Vanistendael 2010).  
 Regardless of the potentials of such tremendous institutional and constitutional 
changes, the fact that at a political level such ambitious projects of centralisation are being 
contemplated demonstrates the change in the perception and the mentality of the EU 
executives that are trying to find ways to build a ‘fiscal Union’ as a complement of the EU 
and as an antidote to the current and future crises. If this undertaking is implemented and 
on condition that it meets the necessary legality and legitimacy criteria, it will provide the 
first opportunity for the EU citizens  
 
4. Conclusion 
 
The answer to the question whether the EU, faced with the recent unprecedented crisis 
has demonstrated a solidary spirit, depends on one’s understanding of the concept of 
solidarity. As the analysis of the EU ‘redistribution framework’ showed even in the ‘most 
redistributive policy of all’, the EU Cohesion policy, political conflicts and bargaining show 
that there is no room for purely altruistic motives and transfers completely detached from 
self-interest or Member States’ interdependencies. For this it is not only the Member States 
to be denounced. Instead, this ‘negative’ or ‘reciprocal’ solidarity is inherent in the EU by 
reason of the huge differences among the Member States and the lack of a common demos 
and ethos among the EU people. The different interests, performances and preferences 
displayed by the participating Member States at the EU cohesion, the financial assistance 
and the new economic governance branches are telling of the unfavorable environment 
within which a positive or altruistic solidarity was expected to flourish. Despite the lack of 
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these normative elements, the invention by the EU of new mechanisms to redistribute 
money and to better monitor the budgets of the Member States proves that inter-state 
solidarity in its reciprocal or ‘effects-based’ form was exhibited at an inter-state level. 
 While social justice and ‘social solidarity’ were not the main drive behind the financial 
assistance measures, a window of opportunity has opened to the EU to promote its social 
values through its increasing interference in the budgets of the Member States as stipulated 
in the Six Pack and the European Semester. Despite the democratic legitimization deficit 
this competences’ expansion entails, this opportunity, if utilized accordingly by the 
Commission, could allow the EU to finally assume an active role towards a ‘bottom-up’ 
approach for an ‘EU social policy’.  
The lesson from the EU response to the crisis is not only that solidarity, at least in 
what concerns the EU ‘redistributive’ policies, cannot be understood as an altruistic or 
positive concept, but also, rather gloomily, that it seems completely deprived of its legal 
value. The fact that (transnational) solidarity is not considered among the main driving 
principles behind the recently adopted measures as a response to the crisis, but it has 
instead cropped up in sharply different ways in the rhetorics and communications of 
political parties of all hues across the Union is demonstrative of the malleability of the 
principle as well as the self-interest motives that underpin it.XXXIII  
Against the hybrid but effective redistributive mechanisms created by reason of the 
crisis, the road towards a fiscal Union that would allow the EU to raise taxes and operate a 
federal budget seems long and the prospects of an EU fiscal federation appear bleak. Such 
an undertaking would require, in addition to the revision of the current legal framework, an 
increased democratic legitimacy that could only be provided if the people of Europe were 
united by a common identity.  
 In lack of other effective redistributive means in the EU, the better management of 
the EU budget should be put in the spotlight. In this respect, in order for optimal 
redistribution to be achieved and social and economic cohesion to be attained, a revision 
and simplification of the current very complex multi-level governance structure of the EU 
Funds is needed and better monitoring and sanctioning on behalf of the EU is required. 
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anonymous referees for their valuable comments. All errors remain my own. 
I See Article 2 TEU, Art. 122 TFEU and the ‘solidarity clause’ under Art. 222 TFEU.  
II Borger has termed the solidarity that exists by reason of this interdependence as ‘factual’ solidarity, as 
opposed to the ‘normative’ solidarity which is distinguished from the ‘factual’ one as it aspires to serve a 
common good. See in Borger 2013: 10. 
III See for instance Barnard 2005: 157-160; Giubboni 2007: 374; Somek 2007 and Ross 2010 who argue that 
solidarity is a legal concept in EU law. 
IV In this sense, the principle of solidarity is unable to fulfil the direct effect conditions, that the obligations it 
entails must be precise, clear and unconditional and that they do not call for additional measures, 
either national or European. 
V The concept of limited solidarity in the EU is not new but has been affirmed by the CJEU in Case 
C‑184/99 Grzelczyk [2001] ECR I‑6193, paragraph 44, and Case C‑209/03 Bidar [2005] ECR I‑2119, 
paragraph 56. 
VI These questions draw heavily from the discussion on distributive justice. See, Rawls 1971, Nozick 1974 and 
Narveson 2003. 
VII See Cases C-341/05 Laval un Partneri Ltd v Svenska Byggnadsarbetareforbundet [2008] and C-438/05 
International Transport Workers' Federation v Viking Line ABP [2008]. For a discussion see Scharpf 2002 
and Scharpf 2010.. 
VIII According to Stjernø, ‘solidarity can most fruitfully be defined as the preparedness to share resources with 
others by personal contribution to those in struggle or in need and through taxation and redistribution 
organised by the state’. Similarly, for Habermas ‘Such an effort would require Germany and several other 
countries to accept short and medium-term negative redistribution effects in its own longer-term self-interest 
— a classic example of solidarity [...] [Habermas 2013b].  
IX In this sense, redistribution as used in this article encompasses the ‘social dimension’ of solidarity, for 
instance, the promotion of social welfare functions.  
X For a discussion on the merits and demerits of progressive income taxation and its ‘justice’ see F.A. Hayek 
‘Taxation and Redistribution’ in The Constitution of Liberty (Routledge Classics, 2006), 266-281.  
XI See the famous critique of Nozick (1974) to Rawls (1971).  
XII The idea of a Reciprocity Based Internationalism (RBI) was developed by A. Sangiovanni, as an idea best 
expressing EU solidarity at present. According to this concept, ‘demands for social solidarity at all levels of 
governance can be understood as demands for a fair return in the mutual production of important collective 
goods’ (Sangiovanni 2013).  
XIII Note, however, the ‘neoliberal’ objection, according to which the EU cohesion policy’s objective is to 
create an internal market insulated from political and governmental interferences. In this respect, cohesion 
policy has more an allocative rather than a distributive function, whereby it aims to stimulate growth and 
competitiveness in the market by increasing GDP per head rather than redistributing income to poorer 
regions. For this argument, see Marks 1996: 391. 
XIV For the division between ‘net payers’ and ‘net beneficiaries’ see for instance, European Commission, 
‘Cohesion Policy 2007 – 2013: Commentaries and Official Texts’ (2007) 24. According to the Commission’s 
report of the past programming period, Poland figured as the leading recipient, followed by Italy, Spain, 
Hungary and the Czech Republic.  
XV See Regulation 1303/2013, Article 19 ‘ex ante conditionalities’. 
XVI OLAF reports that for 2011 €691.4 million was recovered as a result of OLAF's cases, out of which the 
highest recoveries were recorded in the structural funds sector (€524.7 million), followed by customs (€113.7 
million) and agriculture (€34 million).  
XVII See for instance the opposition voices raised by the Netherlands and Denmark during the Agenda 2000 
debate and by Sweden, the UK and Germany during the 2000 – 2005 period, in Bachtler et al. 2013: 130.  
XVIII The Managing Authorities (MA) of the Member States are responsible for tasks ranging from the 
selection of operations and the management of the Funds to the auditing, payment, monitoring and drawing 
up of evaluation plans. (Art. 125 Reg. 1303/2013).  
XIX On the pursuit of distributive and allocative goals through regulation see also Posner 1971: 22-23: ‘[...] 
only if we modify existing views by admitting that one of the functions of regulation is to perform 
distributive and allocative chores usually associated with the taxing or financial branch of government.’  
XX Case C-370/12 Pringle [2012] ECR I-0000. 
XXI Case C-62/14 Gauweiler and Others v Deutscher Bundestag (OMT) of 16 June 2015, 
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ECLI:EU:C:2015:400. 
XXII I am referring here to the recent case law of the CJEU (Pringle, Gauweiler) as well as the Treaty 
amendment and the insertion of Art. 136 (3) TFEU.  
XXIII Taking the example of Greece, the idea behind the first MoU and the Council Decision that 
incorporated it was to reinforce fiscal supervision and reduce the Greek deficit. Following this challenge both 
the MoU and the subsequent adjustment programmes laid out a very specific list of measures to be 
undertaken by Greece, including measures pertaining to direct taxation, limits to the maximum pensions and 
the abolition of the solidarity allowance. According to Article 2 Council Decision 2010/320/EU, 10 May 
2010: ‘Greece shall adopt the following measures before the end of June 2010: (a) a law introducing a 
progressive tax scale for all sources of income and a horizontally unified treatment of income generated by 
labour and capital assets; […] (d) the abolition of most of the budgetary appropriation for the solidarity 
allowance (except a part for poverty relief) with the aim of saving EUR 400 million;(e) a reduction of the 
highest pensions with the aim of saving EUR 500 million for a full year (EUR 350 million for 2010); (f) a 
reduction of the Easter, summer and Christmas bonuses and allowances paid to civil servants with the aim of 
saving EUR 1 500 million for a full year (EUR 1 100 million in 2010); (g) the abolition of the Easter, summer 
and Christmas bonuses paid to pensioners, though protecting those receiving low pensions, with the aim of 
saving EUR 1 900 million for a full year (EUR 1 500 million in 2010) […]’. 
XXIV Regulation 1175/2011 amending Regulation 1466/97 on the strengthening of the surveillance of 
budgetary positions and the surveillance and coordination of economic policies [2011] OJ L306/12; 
Regulation 1177/2011 amending Regulation 1467/97 on speeding up and clarifying the implementation of 
the excessive deficit procedure [2011] OJ L306/33; Regulation 1173/2011 on the effective enforcement of 
budgetary surveillance in the euro area [2011] OJ L306/1; Directive 2011/85/EU on requirements for 
budgetary frameworks of the Member States [2011] OJ L306/41; Regulation 1176/2011 on the prevention 
and correction of macroeconomic imbalances [2011] OJ L306/25; Regulation 1174/2011 on enforcement 
measures to correct macroeconomic imbalances in the euro area [2011] OJ L306/8. 
XXV The  recent  example  of  France i s  te l l ing  of  the  Commiss ion ’s  involvement in 
budge ta ry  dec i s ion -mak ing .  After a long political clash between Paris and Brussels, the danger of 
France becoming the first Member State to be sanctioned for the first time for failing to comply with the EU 
set budget deficit standards, has for now been averted. On this see Dalton 2015.  
XXVI The discussion on attributing the EU a fiscal capacity and on turning it into a full fiscal Union is not 
new; It was discussed during the negotiations of the ‘failed’ Constitutional Treaty and as a result of the 
Laeken Declaration but failed to pass the Council.  
XXVII The report argued, inter alia that: ‘The smooth functioning of the EMU requires not only the swift and 
vigorous implementation of the measures already agreed under the reinforced economic governance 
framework (notably the Stability and Growth Pact and the Treaty on Stability, Coordination and 
Governance), but also a qualitative move towards a fiscal union.’ 
XXVIII The creation of a new taxation power at the EU level, or a power to raise revenue by indebting itself on 
the markets (presently barred by Articles 310 and 311 TFEU) would require unanimity as provided under the 
ordinary revision procedure in Article 48 TEU.  
XXIX European Commission, Proposal for a Council Directive ‘Implementing enhanced cooperation in the 
area of financial transaction tax’, (14 February 2013) COM(2013) 71 final. 
XXX The traditional own resources comprise custom duties from imports outside the EU, Gross National 
Income (GNI), VAT.  
XXXI The enhanced cooperation mechanism does not attribute to the European Parliament the requisite role 
for the fulfilment of the principle ‘no taxation without representation’. Instead, the Parliament’s role could 
only be upgraded through the use of the ‘passerelle clause’ as provided in Art. 333 (2) TFEU. On the ‘passerelle 
clause’ see Amato 2007: 1272. On the use of the ‘passerelle clause’ in the EU’s tax raising powers, see Fabbrini 
2014: 173-174. 
XXXII European Commission, A blueprint for a deep and genuine economic and monetary union - Launching 
a European Debate, (30 November 2012)COM(2012) 777 final/2, p. 33. 
XXXIII To illustrate this, the left-leaning Syriza in Greece and Podemos in Spain have used the notion of 
solidarity as a sword to argue for further and deeper integration, while extreme right wing parties in France, 
Denmark and the UK have wielded solidarity as a shield against the very same process. These examples 
demonstrate the understanding of solidarity in its ‘negative’ sense, that is solidarity for one’s self, directed to 
the satisfaction of one’s own interest, for the Member State itself, as opposed to solidarity in its ‘positive’ 
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sense which is undergone by the principles of reciprocity and altruism and is directed towards the ‘common 
good’. 
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